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1 Abstract 
 
There is usually no purposeful connection between the physical planning of refugee camps and the 
social outcomes for those living in these camps with each being treated separately by independent 
groups or more often the case by different organizations. And while there will be some exchange of 
information, such as the siting of a community office, the two disciplines remain separate and 
separated.   
 
However, recent work by Mair et al. (Mair and Mair, 2003) suggests that there are potentially more 
links and connections then presently realized and certainly beyond the simple planning suggested 
above. 
 
This paper presents the results of a field trial of an Opportunity Matrix for Sexual Violence Against 
Women and Children in Refugee Camps  developed by Dugan (now Mair) et al. and applied for the 
first time in Ardamata Camp in El Geneinna, (the provincial capital of West Darfur) in June/July 
2004. Although this was not a refugee situation but rather an internally displaced person (IDP) 
situation, the Opportunity Matrix (OM) can be applied in IDP situations as well.      
 
The results from this field trial (albeit small) support Mair’s position that the physical and 
administrative environment can affect social outcomes .Whereas further field trials are necessary, the 
results show that planners need to better understand this linkage so as to bring about more effective 
planning changes for better social outcomes. 
 
 
2 The Development of the Opportunity Matrix 
 
Sexual violence against women and children is common in conflict emergencies. Dahrendorf 
describes the situation as follows: “The picture is very bleak. Children and women in conflict affected 
areas face the constant threat of all forms of gender based violence including rape, prostitution, 
trafficking, forced pregnancy as well as violence and instability that impact their entire community in 
a time of conflict” (Dahrendorf, 2004).  
 
Dahrendorf underlines this bleak outcome by the following: 
•  In Bosnia and Rawanda, rape was used as a weapon of war with approximately 250,000 
women raped in both countries. 
• 2 out of 3 of those raped in Rawanda became HIV positive. 
• 35% (of a 304 UNICEF sample) of those raped in Rawanda became pregnant. 
• This resulted in high risks of maternal mortality, infant mortality and the adoption of unsafe 
abortion techniques. 
• Post conflict characterised by a rapid increase in prostitution, increased domestic violence, 
vulnerability to HIV and other sexual transmitted infections. 
• The UNHCR report in 2002 citing refugee girls exchanging sex for assistance. 
 
Hence, sexual violence is unfortunately a significant issue. 
 
The Opportunity Matrix for Sexual Violence against Women and Children (OM) is a seemingly 
straightforward tool in the form of a matrix (or table) that maps the resources that the refugees and 
IDP’s require against the questions of “who, where, when, how, and with whom”. A hypothetical OM 
is shown below and the completed matrix from Ardamata Camp (which this paper presents) is 
included in Appendix 1. Use of a matrix is not new and a similar approach was proposed by Anderson 
et al. (Anderson, 2000). However, Anderson’s approach requires several different matrices, while the 
OM approach is concentrated into one. Its simplicity makes it more practical and portable in the field 
and gives a better “visual snapshot” of the situation. 
A reflective analysis of the resulting matrix highlights the “opportunities” for sexual violence in a 
camp and moreover suggests alternative site planning approaches to minimise (and hopefully 
eliminate) such opportunities. The trial of the OM was completed with the assistance of Ms. Zeinab 
Khatir (from Save the Children USA, based in West Darfur) without whom, this field trial would not 
have been as in-depth as it turned out to be.  
 
Table 1: A Hypothetical Opportunity Matrix 
 WHERE 
does activity 
take place or is 
good / service 
obtained 
WHO 
is in charge of 
activity or  
distributes 
good/service 
WHEN 
does activity 
take place or is 
good/ service  
obtained 
HOW 
Is good/ service  
obtained 
WHO 
engages in 
activity or 
obtains good/ 
service and 
WITH WHOM 
FUEL firewood 
gathered in 
woods north of 
camp 
NA early morning self women and 
children alone or 
with each other 
FOOD Distribution 
Centre 
male volunteers 
in camp 
Saturday 
mornings 
vouchers women alone 
LATRINE east side of camp 
at end of 
secluded unlit 
path 
NA all hours self women and 
children alone or 
with each other 
 
 
3 Background to the Darfur Situation 
 
Darfur consists of 3 states and occupies the western area of Sudan.  It is a large area of approximately 
256,000 square kilometres with an estimated population of 5 million people from a complex tribal 
mix. Large parts of Darfur are prone to drought and desertification that intensifies demands on its 
more fertile lands.  In recent decades, areas of Darfur have been subject to sporadic inter-tribal 
clashes over the use of such resources. 
 
From early 2003, fighting intensified in the region following the emergence of two armed groups, the 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and later the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and the 
commencement by them of hostilities against the Government. (Commission on Human Rights, 2004) 
 
Following a string of SLA victories in the first months of 2003, the Government of the Sudan 
appeared to have sponsored a militia composed of a loose collection of fighters, apparently of Arab 
background, mainly from Darfur, known as the “Janjaweed”.  In certain areas of Darfur, the 
Janjaweed have supported the regular armed forces in attacking and targeting civilian populations 
suspected of supporting the rebellion, while in other locations the Janjaweed played the primary role 
in such attacks with the military in support. 
 
The humanitarian fallout of these attacks across the 3 states of Darfur (and the border regions of Chad) 
was an estimated one million IDPs by May 2004 (compared with 250,000 in September 2003).   
 
In May, over half of these (some 570,000) were located in West Darfur, with the remainder being 
divided between North and South Darfur (approximately 290,000 and 140,000, respectively).  And by 
July 2004, there were 601,096 IDP’s in camps in West Darfur (based on the Master Matrix compiled 
by the United Nations Organisation for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Al 
Geneina). 
 
Sexual violence and rape of the IDP’s was being reported and hence the impetus for this application 
of the OM. Was this occurring and if so where and when? And what could be done as part of the site 
planning for the camps were the research questions to be addressed. But clearly, these were more then 
solely research questions. 
 
It was not obvious from the outset as to what extent such sexual violence was being perpetrated. The 
impression in the camps was of a complex emergency but without the more sinister tones suggested 
by such reports. Figure 1 below shows typical photographs of the camp. However, that view quickly 
changed once the OM was completed. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Typical Camp Context in West Darfur 
 
 
 
4 Survey Approach 
 
The survey was administered by Ms. Zeinab Khatir to a group of 90 women at Ardamata camp. She 
had been previously working with the group in the area of sexual violence and had access to 
established women’s groups in both Kirinding and Ardamata Camps. Cultural and gender barriers 
meant that no males could be present at such meetings and hence the OM in Appendix 1 was 
constructed immediately after their meeting based on notes and a marked up matrix completed by Ms. 
Khatir. This process/discussion was also digitally tape recorded for later review and checking.   
 
The initial intention was to survey the 3 main camps in Geneina namely Riyad, Ardamata and 
Kirinding Camps in one day. The 3 camps were selected because they were largest of the camps in 
and around Geneina, access was possible, and finally they presented the lowest allowable security risk. 
One could assume worst results in outer lying camps of which there were a further 15. A comparison 
of the statistics for the 3 selected camps and site planning issues in each are given in Table 2 below to 
give a sense of the typical planning issues addressed at each camp , as well as to highlight the need 
for these connections to social change mentioned at the introduction of this paper. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of the Site Planning Issues at Riyad, Ardamata and Kirinding Camps 
Camp  Site Planning Issues. 
Riyad Camp as 
at July 13 2004 
 
22,666 IDP’s according to a Doctors without Borders (MSF) June population 
study (taken from the OCHA Master Matrix 12 July).  
Fire breaks required in the “cramped” sections of the camp in the East and West 
sectors. 
Lack of registration is blocking food and Non Food items NFI aid to the IDP’s 
Walking distances to water points over 400 metres. (Well above United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and SPHERE standard of 100 
metres). 
Waiting times in the queues for water at the hand pumps is typically 2+ hours. 
Given that 3-4 trips are required each day means that water collection occupies 
most of the day. 
As a consequence of this waiting time tempers queue jumping is popular. Hence 
there are arguments and tempers flare.  
Water quality is questionable. 
Water presently supplied to IDP’s 2.5 litres/person/day of water. (Well below 
UNHCR and SPHERE absolute survival standard of 7 litres/person/day). 
Water table 20 metres below ground level. 
Latrines are not evident and the few that were checked were non functional.  
Sanitation is a significant issue for the camp. 
Nozzle reduction suggested for the standard UNICEF hand pump as it presently 
set up does not match the jerry can opening (resulting in increased water 
wastage). 
Ardamata 
Camp as at July 
13 2004 
 
23,662 IDP’s (OCHA Master Matrix 5 July) 
Issues of monitoring water supply 
Water table 5-6 metres 
33% of the camp have to walk further than the SPHERE or UNHCR standard of 
100 metres to collect water  
Some IDP’s have to walk 400+ metres to collect water. 
Algae growth evident in jerry cans 
Less than 7 litres/person/day for water. Depending on how it’s measured the 
best estimate is 5.6 litres/person/day but the feeling from the review of the 
camp, the access to the well and the filling of the plastic tanks that it was closer 
to 1 to 2 litres/person/day. 
Maintenance required around bladder. 
Disinfection of at least one well required (frogs living in the bottom and 
periodically being sucked up into the drinking water) 
Cooling water from the diesel pumps should not be feed back into the drink 
water well. 
Camp area 840,000 m2 which is approximately 35 m2/person and within 
acceptable standards. 
Existing roads and open fields need to be maintained as fire breaks. Where ever 
possible these need to be widen out to 30 metres in the areas outlined in the 
report. 
Sanitation is not working. While many but certainly not all latrines were 
checked this was a problem in the camp. All of those checked were non 
functional for various reasons and in many cases that were not checked the run 
down nature and consequent lack of privacy of the super structure made it 
“unusable” 
Kirinding 
Camp as at July 
13 2004 
 
The camp population is between 14,213 (estimate by WHO) and 22,249 (May 
Registration by CONCERN) IDP’s (taken from the OCHA Master Matrix 12 
July). 
Camp is spread in and around the village of Kirinding. 
Fire safety an issue in the “cramped” lower section adjacent to the Kaja River. 
Water supplied is between 3.8 to 4.1 litres/person/day. 
Queue times of the order of 1- 2 hours but as there was a registration in progress 
at the same time times are probably consistent with those found in Riyad camp. 
Chlorination levels were questioned. 
Sanitation is not working. 
Camp are is 16-25 m2/person. On the low side but OK given the village context. 
Work required protecting the well adjacent to the river. 
 
It was clear after completing Ardamata Camp that each camp would require a full day’s work. But 
because of other workload commitments only 1 of these 3 camps was eventually completed. 
Nonetheless, the results from Ardamata Camp are sufficient to show the potential of the OM approach 
and what is seemingly a straightforward process.  
 
 
 
5 Findings  
 
The use of a modified OM in the Ardamata Camp revealed the stark reality of camp life and the 
immense hardship particularly for women and children.  
 
Women must wake up early to either collect wood as far as 2- 3 kilometres from the camp or work in 
Geneina which entails a two-hour walk. Only older women, some carrying babies, collect firewood, 
and they travel in groups to avoid being abused or sexually assaulted by the Janjaweed.  
 
The women who work in Geneina face similar threats of abuse and sexual violence during their 2+ 
hour walk from the camp to town. They also travel in groups for protection. The women work as 
either domestics or as labourers with a typical pay of approximately 3,000 SP/day (less then $1 USD). 
After work, the woman typically buys supplies and other necessities with their earnings before the 
return walk back to Ardamata Camp.  
 
Men do not leave the camp (at least not during the day) because they would be shot if they did. It was 
significant that 16 of the 90 women present at the meeting have apparently lost contact with their 
husbands.  
 
After collecting firewood, the women who are at the camp and older (female) children and teenagers 
will then start queuing and collecting water from the tanks. This usually requires 3-4 trips per day 
with queue times of up to 2-3 hours.  
 
There is a clearly a lack of security in this camp. And the snapshot the OM provides goes beyond 
identifying solely the opportunities for sexual violence (which in itself makes the OM an excellent 
planning tool) but also highlights areas where camp management can be improved. The completed 
OM is attached as Appendix 1. 
 
Consequently, the findings from the use of the OM are as follows: 
• There is a complete lack of security in the camp that is deeply impacting the safety and 
protection of the IDP’s. This finding was not unexpected but the extent to which it impacts on the 
IDP’s was not.  
• The main opportunity for sexual violence against women is during the collecting of fuel. The 
IDP’s have responded to this risk by sending out only older women in groups to gather fuel. 
Apparently older women (those over 45) are less prone to such acts. This is tragic. It also suggests 
that physical violence and rape are opportunist acts resulting from a lack of security).  
• The second key opportunity (though not specifically identified as such by the women but by 
the OM) is during their walk from Ardamata Camp to Al Geneina for work. This is potential a 
significant opportunity as 60 of the 90 women present at the meeting, indicated that they work 
(presumably part time or as work is available).  
 
From a site planning perspective, collecting fuel and walking to work are the two main areas that need 
to be addressed to minimise the opportunity for sexual violence against women and children. 
 
Other camp management issues that arose as part of the OM are as follows: 
•  The significant amount of time and work associated with collecting water is highlighted by 
the OM. Women and children typically have to make 3-4 trips/day to gather water for drinking, 
cooking, washing, and bathing. Distances for IDP’s to collect water (as highlighted in previous 
reports), water storage in the household, and the number of jerry cans need to be addressed. In 
discussions with IDP’s, they identified water storage in the house hold and the number of jerry cans 
as the main issues. MEDAIR is addressing shorter distances (presently over 400+ metres compared to 
SPHERE UNHCR standards of a maximum 100 metres). However, water storage capacity in the 
households still remains a pressing issue. 
• Medical clinics are not doing triage but apparently take the first 50 patients on a first come, 
first serve basis. Thus, any serious cases which arrive after the first 50 are not seen by a doctor. This 
is causing problems for the IDP’s and needs to be reviewed. 
• The use of the school latrines was noted. It appears that because these were “serviced” 
regularly by the associated schools that they were relatively in better condition then other latrines. It 
should be noted that none of the other latrines outside the school were functioning (see table 1 above) 
and this would increase the vulnerability of women and children.   
• The lack of adequate camp security was also an issue. And there were suggestions that the 
camp security were part of the insecurity issues being faced in the camp. The lack of security both for 
the IDP’s and aid workers in West Darfur was a central issue. The historical background shows that 
there was not the support from the Sudanese Government that there should have been and this was 
high lighted in the OM. The IDP’s were locking houses at night (it was considered unsafe to be 
outside after  8.30pm), had animals for alarms, built fences to deflect intruders and established social 
and neighbour alert networks for protection.  
 
This underlines the potential of the OM in making sense of this situation.  
 
 
6 Planning Outcomes and their Social Consequences 
 
From a planning perspective, it was as if a light had been tuned on and although the situation had not 
changed it looked (and was) different when viewed through the “lens” of the OM. Consequently, the 
above findings lead to the following planning outcomes and recommendations that were different 
from would have otherwise been put forward: 
1. The need for security cannot be over emphasized. Security is lacking at Ardamata Camp and 
there appears to be little deterrent for acts of sexual violence against women and children. 
2. Alternative fuels should be addressed. At the moment women are travelling 2km to collect 
firewood which will increase with time as resources are used. Provision of an alternative fuel would 
eliminate the “deforestation” of the surrounding area while also eliminating a key opportunity for 
sexual violence against women and children in the camp. 
3. A bus service should be provided for IDP’s between the camp and Al Geneina. Alternatively, 
“bus tickets” could be issued as part of the non food items (NFI) ticket for things such as soap. While 
this proposal is problematic because not everyone is registered and has a NFI ticket (soap is given out 
at certain intervals and usually just to the head of household) this approach would greatly assist 
women working in Al Geneina.   
4. A capacity building program looking at providing ferro-cement based water storage jars 
should be reviewed. Alternatively, each household should be given a water storage container as part 
of its NFI. 
5. Medical clinics should review patient numbers to confirm whether the IDP’s have valid 
concerns regarding the apparent intake policy resulting in a patient limit of 50 people. 
6. Distribution of ration should be monitored. It was suggested during the OM that the chiefs 
favour their immediate relatives and such practices (IASC, 2005). 
 
 7 Conclusion  
 
The OM is a tool that alerts planners to safety and other issues within communities in conflict 
situations. The tool works by organizing information but still relies on the experience, knowledge, 
and sensitivity of the user to achieve good (or poor) outcomes. The tool does not in itself provide 
answers but conversely involves the community in determining what those outcomes could and 
should be so that more effective and efficient programs can be delivered.  
 
But the other key lesson to come from this work is that there is a definite link between the physical 
work of camp planners and the desired social outcomes for refugees or IDP’s. It is a wrong 
assumption to treat the physical planning as a separate issue to the social outcomes. They are, as 
demonstrated by the application of this OM, linked more then previously accepted and it is clear that 
planners and engineers need to take up the social consequences of the humanitarian aid they provide. 
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APPENDIX 1. The Opportunity Matrix for Sexual Violence against Women and Children in Ardamata Camp, July 18 2004. 
 OPPORTUNITY MATRIX FOR SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN    
 AND CHILDREN IN ________ARDAMATA_____________________ CAMP.     
 DATE __18/7/04___________ INTERVIEWER__Zeinab Khatir (Save the Children USA)._________ 
N/A = Not Applicable NFI = Non food items HH = Head of Household. 
 
WHERE WHO WHEN HOW WHO WITH WHOM   
does activity take 
place or is it 
obtained? 
is in charge of 
activity or 
distributes 
good/service? 
does activity take 
place or is 
good/service 
obtained? 
is good/service 
obtained (e.g., 
vouchers or as 
needed)? 
engages in activity 
or obtains 
good/service and 
  
FUEL Around the camp, 
2km radius. 
N/A Early morning (7am) 
and after Breakfast 
(9am) 
Walking in groups 
of 10-15 women 
(for security) 
Older women 
(typically over 45) 
sometimes with 
their 
 babies) Younger 
women and 
children prone to 
attacks and rape. 
N/A 
FOOD (collecting 
around camp) 
 Not happening at 
this camp as there 
is no food to 
collect. 
 Not happening at 
this camp as there 
is no food to 
collect. 
Not happening at this 
camp as there is no 
food to collect. 
 Not happening at 
this camp as there 
is no food to 
collect. 
   Not happening at 
this camp as there 
is no food to 
collect. 
 Not happening at 
this camp as there is 
no food to collect. 
FOOD (Market) Usually from the 
market in Geneina. 
Note 75 out of the 
90 women at this 
meeting worked. 
N/A Daily after work From payment for 
work. Typical rate 
is 3000 SP/day. But 
requires a 2-3 hour 
walk each way into 
Geneina. 
Women and some 
children (see notes 
1 & 2 below) 
Work as domestics 
or in building 
FOOD  
(as aid 
distribution) 
In camp. Some 
NGO's distribute to 
household. (see 
note 3 below). 
NGO distribution 
team. 
Typically monthly By ration card. (See 
note 4, 5 & 6 
below). 
Men and women 
HH. 
Distributing agency 
WATER From tanks No control at 
tank 
All hours. Lack of 
storage and jerry cans 
means 3-4 trips/day 
typical. 
By queue. Women and 
children 
Other women and 
children 
LATRINE (during 
the day) 
Men and women 
using school 
latrines (see note 7 
below). Women are 
also using outside 
the camp or on the 
way to work. 
N/A Morning and at night. N/A N/A N/A 
LATRINE (during 
the night) 
School latrines? N/A as above At night go in 
groups. 
N/A N/A 
LATRINE (during 
menstrual cycle) 
as above N/A as above? Usually in the 
morning. More 
water involved. 
N/A N/A 
SHELTER 
(During the day) 
At their shelter Men and children N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SHELTER 
(During the night) 
At their shelter All family sleep 
inside for 
security? (after 
8.30 pm security 
curfew 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SHELTER 
(during rain) 
They get wet. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
CLOTHING N/A but refer to 
washing clothes 
below. 
N/A but refer to 
washing clothes 
below. 
N/A but refer to 
washing clothes 
below. 
N/A but refer to 
washing clothes 
below. 
N/A but refer to 
washing clothes 
below. 
N/A but refer to 
washing clothes 
below. 
MEDICAL 
(within the camp) 
2 clinics in camp Medical staff. Morning  Queue but only the 
first 50 are 
apparently seen. 
Need to come back 
the next day if they 
miss out. See note 
Patients and family 
members 
Medical staff. 
8 below. 
MEDICAL (in 
Town) 
N/A Apparently not 
used? 
N/A  apparently 
not used? 
N/A Apparently not 
used? 
N/A Apparently not 
used? 
N/A Apparently not 
used? 
N/A Apparently not 
used? 
MEDICAL (When 
HH is sick) 
2 clinics in camp Medical staff. Morning  Queue but only the 
first 50 are 
apparently seen. 
Need to come back 
the next day if they 
miss out. See note 
8 below. 
HH is accompanied 
by neighbours. 
Medical staff. 
SECURITY  No security. See 
note 10 below. 
Supposed camp 
security? 
Security is 
particularly an issue 
at night in the camp. 
See note 11 
N/A N/A N/A 
BATHING Women inside their 
shelters. Men 
outside shelters. 
N/A Early morning or at 
night. 
Queue for water All family N/A 
NFI 
DISTRIBUTION 
Camp and 
sometimes house to 
house. 
Distributing 
agency 
3 months ago? By ration card.  Men and women 
HH. 
Distributing agency 
WASHING 
DISHES 
At their shelter. N/A Twice a day after 
meal. 
N/A Women and 
children. 
N/A 
WASHING 
CLOTHES 
At their shelter. N/A Twice a week and in 
some cases daily (See 
note 9 below). 
Queue for water Women and 
children. 
N/A 
VISITING TOWN Daily if working or 
as required. 
N/A During the day. Refer 
to Food (Market) 
above. 
Walking which 
takes 2-3 hours 
each way. 
Women Other women?  
PLANTING 
CROPS 
No planting 
occurring due to 
lack of land and 
No planting 
occurring due to 
lack of land and 
No planting occurring 
due to lack of land 
and security. 
No planting 
occurring due to 
lack of land and 
No planting 
occurring due to 
lack of land and 
No planting 
occurring due to 
lack of land and 
security. See note 
10 & 11. 
security. security. security. security. 
OTHER N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Notes 1. No jobs for men who consequently tend to the children in the camp during the day. 
 
 
2. It is not safe for men to go outside the camp. 16 of the 90 women in the discussion group have lost contact with their husbands 
since coming to the camp. 
 
3. Many people missed out on distributions to household because of the daily requirements of simply surviving (that can be sensed 
from reading this matrix). 
 4. Some agencies combine food and NFI ration cards. 
 
5. The chiefs appear to be issuing all the ration cards for the people that they are responsible for. There were questions as how the 
chiefs distributed the cards (and suggestions that the chiefs favour their immediate relatives). 
 6. Chiefs and sheiks are apparently elected by their people. This seems at odds with note 5 above? 
 7. School latrines are apparently maintained but their use by those outside the school is causing issues with the  school 
 8. No triage is done and patients are seen on a first come first served basis. 
 9. Those that are washing daily are doing so because of a lack of clothes. 
 10. Security is a major issue in the camp and is not being provided. The IDP's reported that theft of radios, clothes, and  
 food is common and that they suspect that the camp security are involved in many of these instances. 
 11. Curfew is at 8.30 pm and after that time it is dangerous to be outside one's house. 
 
